Regional security complex theory and insulator states: The case of Turkey by McLean, WA
 
Regional Security 
Complex Theory and 
Insulator States:  









By Wayne McLean 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts with Honours (International Relations) 
School of Government 
University of Tasmania 
3
rd




I declare that this dissertation contains no material which has been accepted for the award 
of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any tertiary institution and that, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief, this dissertation contains no material previously published 
or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the 
dissertation. 
I declare that this dissertation is not more than 16,500 words in length, exclusive of 
bibliography, footnotes, appendices and any maps or other illustrative material. 
 
Wayne McLean 




I would like to thank Dr. Matthew Sussex for his support and enthusiasm while acting as my 
supervisor for this project. Dr. Terry Narramore’s assistance has also been invaluable 
throughout my Honours year. Finally, I want to thank Sam, Oscar, and Edgar for their 




Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................... 7 
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 8 
Chapter Outline ........................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 2: Security Discourses ...................................................................... 11 
Understanding Regions................................................................................................ 12 
Policy Outputs ............................................................................................................. 16 
Outliers in IR frameworks: The Buffer State ................................................................ 17 
The Copenhagen School .............................................................................................. 18 
Security Definitions ..................................................................................................... 20 
Sectoral Analysis .......................................................................................................... 22 
Case Selection – Turkey ............................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 3: Turkey and the Middle East RSC .................................................... 25 
Polarity and Anarchic Structure ................................................................................... 25 
The Political Sector: Neo-Ottoman Agenda ................................................................. 27 
The Societal Sector: Champions of Islam versus Secularists ....................................... 30 
The Economic Sector: The New East ........................................................................... 35 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 37 
Chapter 4: Turkey and the EU RSC ................................................................. 38 
Polarity and Anarchic Structure ................................................................................... 39 
The Economic Sector: EU integration .......................................................................... 41 
The Political Sector: Greco-Turkish Conflict................................................................. 43 
The Societal Sector: A Society Split ............................................................................. 45 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 48 
Chapter 5: Analysis ....................................................................................... 49 
Insulators Elevate Certain Security Issues in Order to Securitise Them ...................... 49 
Internal Forces Contribute to Insulation ..................................................................... 51 
Different Sectors Pushing in Different Directions Constrain Insulators ....................... 52 
Many Turkish Actions Result from Structural Constraints ........................................... 54 
RSCT is a Problematic Via Media ................................................................................. 56 
 5 
 
RSCT Variations ............................................................................................................ 57 
Chapter 6: Conclusions .................................................................................. 58 
Main Findings .............................................................................................................. 58 
Potential for Further Research .................................................................................... 60 
Bibliography ................................................................................................. 61 
Appendix A ................................................................................................... 70 
Regional Subsystem Attribute List ............................................................................... 70 
Appendix B ................................................................................................... 71 




AKP Justice and Development Party (‘Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’) 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
CHP  Republican People’s Party (‘Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’) 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank 
EEC European Economic Community 
EU European Union 
FP Foreign Policy 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GDP PPP Gross domestic product at purchasing power parity 
GFC Global Financial Crisis 
IPE  International Political Economy 
IPS International Political System 
IR  International Relations 
MEADS Medium Extended Air Defence System 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
RSC Regional Security Complex 
RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory 
SEATO South-East Asian Treaty Organisation 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
Turkish names and terms are written using the alphabet introduced as part of Atatürk’s 
reforms in 1928. This extends the Latin alphabet, using the letters Ç (/tʃ/), Ğ (/ɰ/), I (/ɯ/), İ 
(/i/), Ö (/œ/), and Ş, (/ʃ/). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
States that exist on the periphery of regions have a conspicuous role in the 
international system that has consistently challenged scholars. Here, minor states such as 
Afghanistan and Vietnam have shaped great power politics despite their relatively weak 
strength and positions in international affairs. Realist approaches have sidestepped these 
outlier states by calling them buffers or proxies, while neoliberalist perspectives have 
generally ignored states that paradoxically have had an impact on international relations 
that is disproportionate to their economic wealth and institutional engagement. 
For this reason, Turkey represents an excellent case through which to examine these so-
called ‘outlier’ states. Turkey has traditionally occupied a position at the periphery of both 
Europe and the Middle East, and until recently has shared the traits of many other outlier 
states by articulating a neutralist foreign policy. But over the past decade, Turkey, under the 
rule of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) has increasingly adopted an assertive 
foreign policy to leverage its new wealth, emphasise its geostrategic position, and highlight 
the positive aspects of its regional historical legacy. 
With this in mind, this thesis evaluates whether Turkey fits neatly into the hybrid 
constructivist-structuralist framework of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Here, I 
investigate if Turkey fits the category of an ‘insulator’—part of RSCTs taxonomy designed to 
fill the ‘outlier’ gap. RSCT is a relatively new approach in the IR canon, first introduced by 
Barry Buzan in 1983 in People, states, and fear,1 and later presented as a grand theory in 
Buzan and Ole Wæver’s 2003 Regions and Powers2 with the goal of creating a via media 
between structuralism and constructivism. Within RSCT, an insulator is a state that cannot 
create links (and hence properly join) the larger Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) that 
surround it. The term insulator seems at face value to have more analytical scope than a 
‘buffer’ state, which according to RSCT describes states within RSCs rather than outside 
them.  
                                                          
1
 Barry Buzan, People, states, and fear: the national security problem in international relations 
(London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983). 
2
 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and powers: the structure of international security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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A central tool within RSCT is sectoral analysis. This expands on the military-political view of 
international politics and adds economic, environmental, and societal sectors to the 
analytical tools available to the researcher with the purpose of potentially identifying 
unique interactions and relationships.3 For this research, I use the economic, societal and 
political sectors in an attempt to identify insulating behaviour which constrains Turkey’s 
relationships with the EU and Middle East. RSCT asserts that despite Turkey’s attempts to 
escape insulation through assertive foreign policy, it will ultimately be restrained. As a 
consequence, the central research question presented here is: does the concept of 
‘insulation’ adequately explain the behaviour of Turkey? 
To undertake this task, I use a single focussed case study that employs sectoral analysis to 
analyse Turkey’s position between two RSCs—the Middle East and EU. This should expose 
whether RSCT is a useful way of explaining Turkish behaviour. After analysing the two 
surrounding RSCs I demonstrate that insulating forces are indeed visible within the RSCT 
discourse. But at the same time, I also find that RSCT as an approach has significant flaws as 
a via media which prohibits it from functioning as a comprehensive framework in which to 
capture the actions of outlier states. 
Despite this, there is potential for some aspects of RSCT to be developed further. This is 
demonstrated through a process identified within the case, which I have termed ‘sectoral 
divergence’. This occurs when different sectors of the state pull in different directions, 
affecting its ability to direct its security concerns in a unified direction, which leads to 
insulation. In Turkey’s case, the economic sector pushes west, while the societal sector 
pushes east. This externally directed insulating behaviour is accompanied by a domestic 
equivalent, where the political sector through the moderate Islamist AKP seeks a revisionist 
agenda, while the secular state ideology of Kemalism restricts it. 
Methodology 
This thesis uses theory-based process tracing in order to assist its conclusions. This 
approach, based on the work of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, allows the 
identification of causal chains between independent variables.4 In other words, process 
                                                          
3
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 7. 
4
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005). 
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tracing these cases using RSCT allows the revelation of causal processes through the use of 
a thematic sectoral-based narrative, rather than a quantitative approach.5  
In terms of data sources, much of the recent research is sourced from translated news 
reports via major Western (English language) news outlets, as well the domestic Turkish 
press including Hürriyet (‘Liberty’), the pro-Kemalist paper, and Zaman (‘Time’), which takes 
a more Islamist and conservative position on political issues. There have been some 
difficulties in accessing Turkish primary sources.6 Nonetheless, these obstacles have not 
affected access to broad and accurate information in English, and in particular on Turkey’s 
stalled accession bid, which has been thoroughly documented under EU language 
conventions.7 
For this research, I use the RSCT’s sectoral approach through the societal, political, and 
economic sectors. Although RSCT specifies five potential sectors, I de-emphasise the 
environmental sector for this thesis. This sector is the least theoretically rigid, being 
captured within political-military sectors up until the 1970s.8 Similarly, I do not address the 
military sector, as this sector does not differ substantially with standard structuralist 
interpretations and might not provide outputs unique to RSCT.9 Indeed, choosing and 
targeting specific sectors is commonplace in the RSCT literature, and has been championed 
in particular by Claire Wilkinson and Olav Knudsen.10 
                                                          
5
 Tulia G. Falleti, “Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something Old, Something 
New,” Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science 
Association 17 (2006): 1. 
6
 Domestic sources are hesitant to analyse the role of Kemalism thanks to Article 301/1 and Law 5816 
of the Turkish Penal Code which makes it illegal to insult Turkey, its institutions, or the ‘legacy of 
Atatürk’. This has been frequently used against journalists reporting on Armenian, Kurdish, and 
Islamic issues. Türk Ceza Kanunu, 301, 2004, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html, 
(accessed May 26, 2011). Additionally, translations of key text are no readily accessible in English. For 
example, the Foreign minister Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s influential autobiography ‘Strategic 
Depth’ (Stratejik Derinlik) has no English translation. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin 
uluslararası konumu (Vefa Yayınları, 2010). Unofficial translated excerpts are available at 
http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/18/walker.php  
7
 European conventions dictate that all documents in regards to the EU must be made available in 
each of the twenty-three member languages. See “EUROPA - Frequently asked questions on finding 
EU publications and documents”, n.d., http://europa.eu/documentation/faq/index_en.htm, 
(accessed May 9, 2011). 
8
 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 71. 
9
 It is important to note that although I do discuss the military throughout this thesis, much of the 
context is in their role as guardian of social identity rather than the traditional role of the military in 
most other states. 
10
 Olav Knudsen, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” Security Dialogue 




This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter two explains and contextualises RSCT in 
recent scholarship, contrasting it with other key debates with the purpose of revealing the 
gaps in existing IR frameworks that the thesis subsequently addresses. Chapter three 
explores Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East, using ‘neo-Ottomanism’11 as the 
starting point. I then explore forces that constrain it from joining this RSC, including 
Kemalism, the Ottoman historical memory12, and the political volatility of the Middle East 
before assessing the outputs for insulating behaviour. In the fourth chapter I switch to the 
EU RSC and explore why Turkey’s EU accession process has never had the sense of urgency 
that has accompanied bids by other candidates such as Romania and Bulgaria. While the 
goals of the Kemalist project have directed it west, towards the most visible economic 
advantages, the economic integration process has been ongoing for almost sixty years, and 
resistance from both domestic and EU actors over the past decade has increased. In doing 
so, I seek to determine whether these delays can be attributed to insulation. In chapter five, 
I assess the extent to which insulation is an appropriate way to understand Turkish 
behaviour, and highlight contributions from outside the RSCT discourse which arguably 
provide rationales that are just as useful. In closing the thesis in chapter six, I provide my 
summary, followed by a brief outline of avenues for future research in relation to how the 
concept of ‘sectoral divergence’ can be further examined. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?,” Security Dialogue 38, no. 1 (March 1, 
2007): 5 -25, (accessed June 1, 2011). 
11
 Ahmet Davutoğlu is the key proponent of ‘neo-Ottomanism’, although he does not use this 
terminology himself. He has an international relations background, and has written extensively on 
the subject as a Professor at Mamara and Beykent Universities. His assertive philosophy is outlined in 
the book Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik). Davutoğlu, Stratejik derinlik. 
12
 Turks are viewed by many Arabs with suspicion due to Ottoman suppression of the caliphate, 
Arabic language and cultural values, along with their alliance with the US since World War II. For 
example, the word ‘Ottoman’ is often used pejoratively in Arabic. See Ofra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, 
“Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and Its Alignment with Israel,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (April 1, 2001): 51-52. 
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Chapter 2: Security Discourses 
Mainstream IR has lacked a central framework for the analysis of regions. Instead it has 
tended to focus on great power politics, which have placed behaviouralism and economic 
discourses at the centre of the debate.13 Realists, in particular, have consistently viewed 
regions in terms of great power interest, using utility based measurements that position 
regions in the context of great power overlay.14 On the other side of the debate, neoliberal 
institutionalists such as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane view economic and institutional 
entwinement at the heart of regionalism, with bodies such as the EU, APEC, and NAFTA 
used as the dominant vehicles for regional analysis.15 Some attempts have been made to 
analyse specific regions, but most often this occurs in isolation, and has been undertaken by 
area specialists such as Amitav Aycharya and David Kang in Asia16, and André Frank in Latin 
America.17 
All these frameworks have troubling gaps, especially in relation to states that do not fit 
within a natural geographically congruent region, and whose positions often have influence 
on the international system disproportionate to their military and latent capabilities. For 
example, a weak state such as Afghanistan has challenged the objectives of great powers 
throughout history (including the Mongols, the Soviets, and most recently the US). Thus 
while most frameworks refer to Afghanistan as a buffer state,18 this is a relatively narrow 
definition that falls short of providing a comprehensive overview of more complex 
                                                          
13
 For example, Waltz only briefly mentions regions in Theory of international politics (Long Grove: 
Waveland Press, 2010). John J. Mearsheimer uses regions extensively in The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), but only in the context of geographical areas in 
which an aspiring hegemon is trying to dominate. The region itself is not analysed, but viewed as 
simply a variable to be controlled. 
14
 Overlay is a term specific to RSCT. This is when great power interest ‘transcends mere penetration, 
and comes to dominate a region’. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and powers, 490. 
15
 Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and interdependence (Harrisonburg: Longman, 
2001). 
16
 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An 
introduction,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 287-312, 
(accessed October 6, 2009). 
17
 André Gunder Frank, Latin América: underdevelopment or revolution (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1970). 
18
 Tanisha M. Fazal, “State death in the international system,” International Organization 58, no. 2 
(2004): 311-344; Michael Greenfield Partem, “The Buffer System in International Relations,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 1 (March 1, 1983): 3. 
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mechanisms at play such as its geostrategic position which combines with a complex tribal 
societal structure and an historically important trade route.  
For this reason, the following chapter presents a chronology of modern regionalist 
approaches, to identify how certain states have ‘fallen through the cracks’. I then show the 
potential for RSCT to address these gaps, before demonstrating that the case of Turkey 
exemplifies a theoretical void in the current literature. As a result I find that Turkey is well 
positioned to test RSCT and the role of the insulator state. I then set up two tests using 
Turkey, in order to appraise RSCT’s value in addressing the status of such buffer states. 
Understanding Regions 
During the 20th century theoretical approaches to the region were subsumed by two 
opposing concepts. Early in the century, liberal internationalism was dominant, with the 
earliest IR scholars such as Alfred Zimmern viewing the future global system in terms of a 
democratised Kantian ideal.19 This was typified by Woodrow Wilson and his fourteen points, 
which was subsequently encapsulated in the League of Nations.20 From this ideational 
perspective, any forms of regional exceptionalism would be largely irrelevant in a 
democratised world built around common values. A single world body would enforce 
international law, and the universality of liberal ideas would help maintain collective order 
and security. But the savagery of World War II, combined with the tepid and ineffectual 
attempts at internationalism by many democratic governments resulted in the emergence 
of a more Hobbesian view of the international political system.21 Led by Hans Morgenthau 
and E.H. Carr, classical realism moved away from what pejoratively became known as 
‘utopianism’. Instead, they refocussed their analysis to the state unit, with the idea of the 
national interest as paramount in all state interaction.22  
                                                          
19
 Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, Nationality & government: with other wartime essays (New York: Robert 
M. McBride & Co., 1918), i-xxiii. 
20
 John MacMillan, “Liberal Internationalism,” in International relations theory for the twenty-first 
century: an introduction, ed. Martin Griffiths (Taylor & Francis, 2007), 21-22. 
21
 Here, the German parliament was particularly ineffectual with instability and parliamentary 
deadlocks thanks to its fractured nature. 
22
 In Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993), 337, the two key concerns are the change in the new ‘non-European’ state, and 
the emphasis on the national interest. Carr is generally scathing of 'utopianists' such as Zimmern 
throughout his book. Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, The twenty years’ crisis, 1919-1939: an 
introduction to the study of international relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 
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Realists viewed regional institutions created after WWII with suspicion, as throughout the 
1930s and 1940s security based regionalism had become synonymous with the German 
style alliances of the First and Second World Wars.23 World War II was particularly relevant 
in this respect, with Nazi aggression in Europe undertaken with the aim of creating a distinct 
regional security order.24 In response, the newly formed UN curtailed the power of regional 
security organisations to use force under Article 53 of the Charter, by requiring specific 
Security Council approval for such organisations to act.25 Overall, this resulted in an 
emphasis on the global order in statist terms, with regional alliances seen as potentially 
dangerous and destabilising. Moreover, the US, as a key architect of the new world order, 
was particularly threatened by regionalism. While states had little scope to challenge US 
hegemony on their own terms, unified security regions—in which the US did not have a 
hand—did have that potential.  
The result was that the regional security arrangements that did exist, such as NATO and 
SEATO, were often sanctioned either by the US (or the USSR in the case of the Warsaw 
Pact). Thus, despite US political opposition to regionalism in political rhetoric, policy 
practitioners (and classical realists) such as George Kennan viewed the world in terms of 
zones of US interest. In Kennan’s framework, the world could be broken down into the US, 
UK, Europe, and Japan—with each region a strategic arena in need of protection from 
Communism.26 The tools used in the application of these policies included the Marshall Plan 
in Europe, while US external balancing and a military presence in Japan contained Soviet 
ambitions in the East. Overall, the links between policy practitioners and theoreticians 
during the Cold War period were extensive, with Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry 
Kissinger being influential scholars as well as high level members of US administrations.27 
                                                          
23
 The Nazi's used predatory economic policies as part of their regime, thus extending the scope of 
security beyond simple military measurements. See John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the 
Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (July 1, 1992): 561-598. 
24
 The most famous of these is the idea of Lebensraum, or ‘living space’ Similarly, Neuordnung, or the 
‘New Order’ was designed to impose a distinct regional hegemonic German order upon Europe. 
25
 “Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements,” The United Nations, June 26, 
1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml, (accessed March 31, 2011). 
26
 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional orders: building security in a new world (University 
Press: Penn State Press, 1997), 111. 
27
 Brzezinski was National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter and a well published scholar on 
geostrategic issues, through the release of works including Between Two Ages: America's Role in the 
Technetronic Era, (New York: Viking Press, 1970) and The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and 
Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New York: Basic Books, 1998). Kissinger was also National Security 
Adviser under Nixon, and also Associate Director of the Harvard School for International Affairs 
where he published extensively. 
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Yet the problems of approaching analysis from only the global level and the real world 
effects of this policy-practice divide could be observed in South-East Asia during the 1960s 
and 70s, when significant errors were made in assessing the influence of Chinese 
communism on Vietnam. Altogether, few tools existed for policy makers to explore regions 
and their internal dynamics, which resulted in poor military responses from the US that are 
still felt today. In a similar manner, emerging security dynamics in areas such as the Middle 
East were misread in terms of simple power politics. For example, the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict is a relatively small conflict in human terms, with around fifteen thousand deaths 
over a sixty-year period,28 yet a 2010 poll found that eighty-eight percent of people in the 
Middle East viewed Israel as the biggest personal threat to their safety.29 This contrasted 
with only twelve percent who believe that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would have a 
negative impact on their safety.30 Consequently, the Palestinian question has become a 
major undercurrent in all US engagement in the Middle East, and has been continually 
exploited by autocratic leaders and extremist groups.31 In this context, ‘less-than-great 
powers’ are influencing the global level system in a regional setting. 
In spite of the dominance of the unitary actor model, research in the 1970s did expand into 
the area of ‘sub-systems’, with William R. Thompson asking whether sub-systems could be 
viewed as distinct regional theatres, or whether regions were simply objects to be viewed in 
terms of great power interest.32 For example, in his article The Regional Subsystem: A 
Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory, he assembled the dominant views on 
regional sub-systems, compiling a set of twenty-one attributes identified by researchers 
(see appendix A). In concluding, he complained that there was no theoretical framework in 
                                                          
28
 This discounts ‘total war’ conflicts such as the Suez War and Six Day War. This figure contrasts with 
the 4,000,000 who have died as a result of the Congo/Zaire Wars from 1967 to the present, yet is 
virtually unknown in US policy circles. “Twentieth Century Atlas - Death Tolls”, n.d., 
http://necrometrics.com/20c30k.htm#Israel, (accessed May 1, 2011). 
29
 Shibley Telhami, “2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll: Results of Arab Opinion Survey Conducted June 
29-July 20, 2010,” Brookings Institution, August 5, 2010, 63, 
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.aspx, (accessed May 1, 
2011). 
30
 Ibid., 78. 
31
 Groups such as Al-Qaeda have leveraged the Palestinian question for their own cause. See Bruce 
Hoffman, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 6 (2003): 432. Gaddafi also provided significant support for the PLO as 
part of his pan-Arabic agenda as described in Craig R. Black, Deterring Libya: the strategic culture of 
Muammar Qaddafi (USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell: DIANE Publishing, 2000), 6-7. 
32
 William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional 
Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (March 1, 1973): 91, (accessed March 9, 2011). 
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which to place this inventory of results, and that future research might enable these to be 
used more fruitfully.33   
Similarly, Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel’s 1979 edited volume, International Politics of 
Regions, documented the emerging sub-system approach, recognizing the importance of 
formulating a framework applicable across regions, which would enable analysis from the 
perspective of regional powers. The research they presented analysed five sub-systems—
Western Europe, West Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East—in order 
to explore these as alternative points for approaching the international system. In the 
process they identified four unique types of subordinate systems—coherent, consolidative, 
cohesive, and integrative—with each possessing a core and periphery.34 They also identified 
‘intrusive systems’ where external powers have a great amount of weight in the internal 
matters of states within a region, as typified by US activities in Latin America and Western 
Europe.35 It is instructive to note that Cantori and Spiegel also found difficulties in finding a 
place for Burma and Afghanistan—similar states to Turkey—within their framework.36 
Unfortunately for Cantori and Spiegel, Kenneth Waltz released the seminal text in 
international relations—Theory of International Politics—in the same year. Regionalism 
played little part in Waltz’s text, which concentrated solely on the state as the central unit of 
analysis.37 The only concession made for regions was that ‘regional problems are part of 
their [the US and USSR’s] concerns.38 On top of this, for Waltz, smaller states only use 
regional issues because of a lack of power to manipulate the larger system.39 It might be 
unfair to criticise Waltz’s lack of work on regions because this was not his intention. Yet the 
point here is to demonstrate that emerging neorealist trends, which cared little for regional 
perspectives, came to dominate the IR discourse until the end of the Cold War.  
 
 
                                                          
33
 Ibid., 102. 
34
 Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, International politics of regions (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-
Hall, 1970), 382. 
35
 Ibid., 31. 
36
 Ibid., 7. 
37
 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of international politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 93-97. 
38






The sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War led to questions about the 
explanatory and predictive power of the realist project in the absence of superpower 
competition. Without regional tools within structuralism, literature on regions increasingly 
turned to institutions such as the EU and APEC through the neoliberal lens, using the 
economic arena for regional data. This economic emphasis throughout the 1990s led to a 
lack of research on regional security dynamics, which in turn contributed to poor regional 
security responses to conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Here, the theory-practice link was 
now much weaker than in the Cold War, yet the primacy of global level analysis remained.40 
For example, in Yugoslavia—which had previously been viewed as a buffer state between 
two regions—the new institutional architecture of the EU resulted in slow responses to the 
conflict (despite its geographical proximity), while the US provided military support despite 
lacking obvious national interest. Both of these outcomes were counter-intuitive to the 
outputs of both the neoliberal and neorealist debates.41 In all, these theoretical 
perspectives failed to adequately describe the dynamics at play in Yugoslavia, including 
deep societal cleavages, the securitisation of historical identities, and the role of existing 
political structures in fractured states, despite the fact Yugoslavia sat close to wealthy states 
such as Italy and Germany.42 In regards to this growing policy-practice divide, Joseph Nye 
recently lamented that IR scholars are much less likely to go on to produce actual useable 
policy than twenty-five years ago, and more often their research is detached from the real 
world.43 
Thus, while regional analysis may have made leeway since the end of the Cold War within 
the economic realm, the limitations of the structural frameworks persist today. For example, 
the poorly understood nature of the Middle East region and the influence of states such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in substandard responses at the foreign policy level over 
                                                          
40
 This is in contrast to Brzezinski, Kennan and Kissinger. While secretaries of State Madeleine Albright 
and Condaleeza Rice came both possessed extensive academic careers before joining their respective 
administrations, their body of work and scholarly weight was not as influential in the scholarly world 
as Brzezinski, Kennan, and Kissinger. See Nye. Joseph S. Nye, “Scholars on the Sidelines,” The 
Washington Post, April 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260.html, (accessed March 7, 2011). 
41
 Christopher Bluth, Norms and International Relations: The anachronistic nature of neo-realist 
approaches., POLIS Working Paper No. 12 (University of Leeds, 2004). 
42
 By this, I mean war was counter intuitive to the potential economic benefits located in proximity to 
two wealthy nations. 
43
 Nye, “Scholars on the Sidelines.” 
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the past decade.44 Similarly, the Arab revolutions of 2011, which started unexpectedly in 
Tunisia, were not described or predicted by mainstream IR scholars.45 While these have 
been reported in the Western media in terms of democratic uprisings, the core issues at 
play (such as food supply, tribalism, and unemployment) were regionally bounded, and 
contingent on a unique spectrum of Middle Eastern issues.46 Overall, the failure to 
adequately describe events lends some credence to Martin Wight’s claim that IR has ‘a 
tradition of speculation’.47  
Outliers in IR frameworks: The Buffer State 
Many of these deficiencies can be attributed to the poor ontologies available for 
describing states that do not fit neatly into major theoretical frameworks. In the past, these 
‘outlier’ states have often been termed ‘buffers’, and have been defined by their neutral 
foreign policies.48 This is generally attributed to pressures from the large powers 
surrounding them, where to favour one is to risk the wrath of the other. Within the little 
research that does focus on buffers, Michael Partem asserts that geography is the only 
precise variable in a state occupying such a role,49 but that foreign policy orientation and 
economic power also work on top of geography to shape state actions.50 This results in a 
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strategy of neutrality, which is expressed by leaning to one side to leverage importance, 
while looking to a third power for support.51 
One premise that many authors make about the buffer position is that it is undesirable.52 
While a state can often leverage such a position to its advantage, it is always vulnerable to a 
larger state’s ambitions. For example, Tibet was used as a buffer state by the British to 
protect its Indian interests from the Chinese53 and lost its independence as a result of the 
ensuing great power politics. Finland also became the object of great power competition 
when it was included in the Soviet sphere of influence, as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, leading to two Russo-Finish conflicts.54 At the same time, paradoxical behaviour is 
visible in how buffered states react to and use their unique positions. For instance, 
Liechtenstein and Andorra were established as buffer states, and both remained neutral and 
unaffected by WWII, despite their lack of military power. Similarly, North Korea, an 
artificially divided and poor ‘hermit’ state has managed to exert significant influence on the 
global stage. Overall, then, the historical survival and weight of many buffer states suggests 
an important role in the international system that has defied traditional approaches.   
The Copenhagen School 
A potentially more satisfying explanation for buffer states in their regional context can 
be found within RSCT using the concept of insulation. RSCT has positioned itself as a theory 
that claims to account for both regions and these idiosyncratic ‘buffer’ states, while 
maintaining the structural foundations of a neorealist approach. According to RSCT, ‘the 
world in a sense consists of three things: RSCs, insulator states, and global level powers’.55 
RSCs themselves are constructed using four variables: geography; the anarchic system; 
power polarity; and the social construction of security threats through patterns of amity 
and enmity (security interdependence).56 An insulator is not part of a RSC itself and is 
wedged in-between two or more RSCs. This differentiates it from a buffer, which only 
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appears within an RSC containing strong security patterns.57 For example, East Germany and 
Yugoslavia buffered two strong ideological poles in the EU RSC throughout the Cold War. In 
contrast, Turkey’s position between three RSCs led to superpower overlay, but this lacked 
the security exigency of the Iron Curtain. This is caused by the ‘zone of relative 
indifference’58 that insulators inhabit, where ‘everything is connected to everything else 
but, relatively speaking, there are lines or zones with much less security interdependence 
than on either side’.59 In blunt strategic terms, insulators absorb the energies of a RSC’s 
periphery,60 which means that states such as Turkey should not be able to ‘bring together 
different RSCs to form one strategic arena’. 61  
 
 
Turkey, the EU RSC, and the Middle Eastern RSC 
This is not to say that insulators are forever locked in this role. Indeed, they can become 
part of an RSC through evolution. According to RSCT, there are three evolutions that can 
occur.62 The first is when states act together to maintain the status quo. The second is 
internal reconfiguration, which could happen, for example, through an internal change from 
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bipolarity to multipolarity. The third is external transformation. This involves a change in 
RSC membership, or alternatively a transformation of its essential structure.63 So, for 
instance, a change in essential structure for Turkey might consist of Syria, Russia and Greece 
acting strategically together against Turkey, which would form a new RSC.64   
Security Definitions 
Given that in the RSCT discourse different actions and behaviours present different 
threats to different actors, a central question concerns the definition of security. Here, the 
Copenhagen School redefines security away from utility-based measurements to one that is 
a contested concept.65 This contrasts with realism, where Cold War-era security was one of 
the ‘least contested concepts’ in IR.66 The Copenhagen School challenges this, with David 
Lake viewing realist ideas about security as simple ‘military subservience’. 67 To him, this 
does not equate to security per se, but rather ‘controlled insecurity’.68 In other words, 
security is not just physical authority, but the ability to efficiently coerce and dominate the 
structures behind securitisable objects, including the economy and environment, or even 
more abstract concepts such as ‘hearts and minds’. 
Instead, Buzan explains that ‘the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed definition’.69 
Likewise, for Ken Booth, the challenge of defining security in this contested form is that it ‘is 
a condition, like health or status, which defies easy definition and analysis’,70 so, the 
provision of security might be described most simply as the ‘absence of threats’.71 Hence, 
security can be ‘life threatening’, but can also be ‘life altering’, and is consequently a relative 
concept.72 When using this meaning, the threat of something as seemingly trivial as a tax 
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increase in an affluent society can be defined in terms of security.73 This is both positive, 
because it allows a moving definition of security, but potentially negative in the sense that 
everything can be securitised, leading to an increasingly complex scope with little practical 
use. 
As a consequence of this shifting definition, the Copenhagen School views the source of 
security in a socially constructed process, which occurs through a three-phase 
‘securitisation’ process. These three phases are: an existential threat to a referent object (a 
speech act); the initiation of emergency actions in order to secure the referent object; and 
acceptance of the speech act by the relevant audience.74 Additionally, the referent object 
has three potential types. The first is non-political. This includes issues that require little or 
no state involvement, such as local governance. The second stage is politicised, which 
means that an issue is dealt with through policy implemented by government. Examples 
here include government legislation such as criminalising insider trading, or providing 
security from violence by prosecuting assaults. The final phase is when an object is 
securitised and politically expedient actions are justified by the securitisation act. Overall, 
securitisation to protect the referent object occurs when the policy-legislative process is too 
slow to deal with something that is perceived as an immediate danger.  
A typical example of securitisation happened in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, where 
the US took extraordinary legal measures, such as labelling jihadists within sovereign states 
as stateless ‘enemy combatants’, in order to counter terrorism. Importantly, the audience—
with some notable exceptions75—accepted the speech act, resulting in terrorism becoming 
successfully securitised. This allowed controversial policy such as the Bybee memo and the 
Patriot Act to be enacted.76 It should be emphasised that securitisation is generally seen as 
                                                          
73
 In this hypothetical example, the ‘rich’ would be the relevant audience, and their living standards 
the referent object, which is ‘threatened’ by increased taxation. 
74
 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 26. 
75
 Support for the occupation of Iraq was high initially in the US, and the UK, but supported 
decreased substantially after the premises for the war were found to be questionable. In the UK, the 
turn in public opinion was particularly sharp, with 1 million in London protesting the war in Hyde 
Park in 2003. “‘Million’ march against Iraq war,” BBC News Online, February 16, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2765041.stm, (accessed May 29, 2011). In this instance, it could be 
argued that Blair terrorism was ‘desecuritised’ as the public rejected the ‘speech act’. 
76
 The Bybee memo allowed the president to possess ‘complete discretion in the exercise of his 
Commander-in-Chief authority and in conducting operations against hostile forces’ which enabled 
policy such as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and the targeting of stateless ‘enemy combatants’ 
under Deputy Assistant Attorney John Yoo’s ‘unitary executive theory ‘ William E. Scheuerman, “Carl 
Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib,” Constellations 13, no. 1 (2006): 118. The Patriot Act also was 
anti-terrorist legislation that gives law enforcement and intelligence agencies the power to eavesdrop 
 22 
 
a negative outcome, and that in order to ameliorate the potential for conflict, it is 
preferable for objects to be desecuritised, and dealt with through normal political 
processes. 
Regional Security Complexes themselves are formed through strong patterns of amity and 
enmity as a consequence of securitisation/desecuritisation processes. Away from the 
regional level, and in acceptance of its (partly) neorealist heritage, RSCT breaks down the 
international system into three tiers, consisting of states, regions, and the global. The global 
level is described as possessing a 1+4+regions77 structure of power. The US is at the apex, 
accompanied by the sub-global powers of the EU, Japan, China and Russia and then regions 
themselves. This is essentially a modified and updated version of a structuralist’s idea of 
bipolarity and multipolarism. Of the global regions, there are eleven security complexes, 
each of which feature one of three internal characteristics—centred, great power, or 
standard.78  
Sectoral Analysis 
The third pillar of the Copenhagen School, following RSCs and securitisation, is the 
ability to analyse the international system using different ‘sectors’. These are 
interchangeable lenses through which the international system can be framed and 
analysed.79 This is not a new concept, but the way that Buzan and Wæver codify sectors into 
a matrix which can be used at multiple analytical levels is unique. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver 
and Jaap de Wilde clarify the sectoral model in ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, 
identifying military, political, societal, economic and environmental areas as the key spaces 
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that interact to form security dynamics, with sectors a way of ‘ordering priorities’80 and 
reducing ‘complexity to facilitate analysis’.81 For example, Turkey might be approached using 
the ‘nation’ as the referent object. Using sectoral discourse, we can frame the 1999 İzmit 
earthquake that killed 17,000 people by using the environmental sector, which was then 
transferred across to the political realm during an unexpected improvement in relations 
with Greece during aid cooperation.82 Thus, sectors are not atomistic lenses in the sense 
that the analyst is bound exclusively to that sector, but instead used to create a tighter focus 
on the issues at play within the securitised object. 
Case Selection – Turkey 
Turkey is an excellent case to assess whether RSCT is a useful way of describing outlier 
states using the category of insulator. First, it fits the outlier label described earlier. Second, 
Turkey sits at the nexus of many of the dilemmas presented in this chapter. Furthermore, 
while a ‘typical’ buffer state, Turkey has a central difference from many buffer states in that 
it is an assertive outlier. Using traditional power measurements, Turkey is strong in the 
military and economic sectors. It is a member of the G20, and possesses military personnel 
numbering over 500,000.83 The combination of economic, military and societal 
assertiveness means that unlike many insulators, Turkey has the capacity to try and escape 
the status quo. Indeed, its recent foreign policy has signalled a desire to do this. The last 
decade has accelerated this shift, where its position is more vulnerable to proximate 
threats, including instability in the Caucasus and the resurgence of political Islam. As it can 
no longer leverage its neutrality in the context of superpower competition, it must compete 
on its own terms. But in spite of this, RSCs predictive tools84 suggest that pressure from the 
peripheries of the EU and Middle East RSCs will constrain its ability to comprehensively link 
its security dynamics outside of its borders, and into other RSCs. 
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An empirical expression of these insulating processes is found in Turkey through 
Kemalism.85 Menderes Cinar views Kemalism as a ‘shield against the outside in the 
aftermath of the Ottoman empire’s decline’,86 which can be interpreted through RSC as a 
policy resulting from insulating forces. This is supported by the fact that Turkish foreign 
policy had been neutral during the Cold War on many regional security issues (such as 
Israel) and until recently it distanced itself from the Middle East politically. As a 
consequence, sectoral analysis should allow a widening of analysis away from Kemalism, to 
explore how recent moves by the AKP have resulted in Turkish Foreign policy moving away 
from a neutral stance, towards a more assertive regional outlook. This is most notable in 
Davutoğlu’s foreign policy, which clearly views Turkey as a central power within a new 
international order.87 As such, these varied and competing security dynamics make for an 
excellent case on which to use the Copenhagen School’s security framework in an attempt 
to observe and analyse insulating behaviour. 
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Chapter 3: Turkey and the Middle East RSC 
In the analysis of Turkey from the perspective of RSCT, I start with the Middle East RSC, 
where a central feature in the structure of the RSC is the diminished role of the state as 
referent object. The most immediate examples are the Kurdish and Palestinian issues, which 
revolve around ‘nations’ rather than states,88 while statist roles within the Arab world have 
consistently been challenged over the past century. The lack of Westphalian identification 
was demonstrated by a 2010 poll on identity which found that thirty-eight percent of 
people in the Middle East identified as Muslim, compared to thirty-three percent who 
viewed state citizenship as their core identity.89 Using RSCT, this lucidness in self-identity 
gives Turkey many more issues to potentially securitise and ‘escape’ insulation, but these 
carry a higher risk given the volatility of the region. I begin this process by looking at the so 
called ‘neo-Ottoman agenda’ pursued by the AKP within the political sector. Next, I widen 
out to the societal sector, where the AKP has attempted to link together the political and 
societal sectors, with Turkey’s societal ‘brand’ under Kemalism a highly restrictive force. In 
ending, I briefly assess the future impact of the small, but growing, economic sector.  
Middle East RSC Structure 
Before moving to the sectoral discourse, I provide an overview of the Middle East using 
RSCTs structural tools. Using these, the Middle East RSC is a standard type90 with no great 
powers, although individual states have put themselves forward as contenders. At various 
points, Gaddafi,91 Nasser,92 and the Baathists in Iraq and Syria93 have attempted to lead 
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regional order through pan-regional expressions of power. Yet frequent low-level warfare 
and religious and tribal conflicts that blur ideas of state sovereignty, have combined with 
poor economic opportunities to prevent any aspirant hegemon emerging. In turn, this has 
left the RSC periphery open to external influence. 
 
The Middle East RSC and sub complexes 
This is shown in the RSCs internal structure, with the Gulf sub complex revolving around a 
‘triangular rivalry’ featuring Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,94 which has resulted in conflicts 
including the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, and hostile Saudi-Iraqi relations as a result of the 
first Gulf War. To the West, in the Levant sub complex, the presence of Israel and its close 
military and political relationship with the US has helped contain Egypt, which defected to 
militarily ally with the US after the Camp David Accords in 1980.95 Similarly, the close US 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, combined with its oil wealth, has buffered potential rivals in 
Egypt and Iraq. This combination of issues makes the Middle East relatively ‘penetrable’ on 
soft issues, when compared to the EU. 
In terms of Turkish engagement with the RSC, Buzan and Wæver map out the First Gulf War 
(1991) as a period which begins a new set of security dynamics of major importance to 
Turkey.96 A significant event was the suppression of the Kurds in northern Iraq by Saddam 
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Hussein, which acted to securitise Kurdish circumstances to a global audience. This put 
restraints on the Turkish elite’s ability to securitise the Kurdish question domestically. The 
decimation of Iraq’s military in the Gulf War over Kuwait further changed the balance of 
power in the region, which in the direct aftermath of the Cold War opened up new 
opportunities for Turkey to venture into the Middle East.  
While useful information is gleaned from structural assessments, these cloak the complex 
political and societal nature of Middle Eastern politics. It is in this situation where the 
Copenhagen School’s sectoral approach can yield interesting results. Thus in the sectoral 
analysis that follows, I start with Turkish regional activism in the political sector and identify 
the key securitisation processes at work, before widening the analysis to look at the 
strategic pragmatism at play in Turkish politics. These show a desire to integrate more 
closely with the region, but the political moves towards the Middle East are constrained by 
societal barriers and the weight of Kemalism, which works to maintain Turkey’s insulated 
position. The economic sector which is so prominent in Western relationships is steadily 
growing, but still has little weight compared to the EU RSC and thus has little impact on 
insulating behaviour. 
The Political Sector: Neo-Ottoman Agenda 
A key unifying idea within the Middle East is solidarity with the Palestinian cause. 
Therefore, for Turkey, which has traditionally refrained from any post-Ottoman forms of 
regional activism, we can identify the events at Davos in 2009 as a critical ‘speech act’ by 
Prime Minister Recip Erdoğan. This acted to securitise the Palestinian question in an 
attempt to draw Turkey into the changing regional security environment. Here, in an angry 
speech, in front of the World Economic Forum (after which he stormed off stage), Erdoğan 
told the Israeli President: 
‘My voice will not be that loud. You must know that. […But…] when it comes to killing, 
you know killing very well. I know how you hit, kill children on the beach’.
97
 
This speech had two purposes: a domestic purpose, which was demonstrated by the 
thousands who turned out at the airport cheering Erdoğan after the conference98; and an 
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international purpose, which sent a signal to the international system that Turkey was 
aligning its security concerns more closely with the Middle East. This was just one of 
numerous securitisation moves by the AKP following its 2007 election victory.99 For 
example, there was little ambiguity when Erdoğan stated in 2009 that ‘no political problem 
in the region can be resolved without [utilising] Ottoman archives’ in front of an assembled 
audience.100 All in all, such actions supported Buzan’s 2003 claim that the AKP has initiated 
the ‘reactivation of Turkey’.101  
The securitisation of the Palestinian question was followed by a surprise deal between 
Turkey and Brazil to support the Iranian nuclear fuel program.102 Here, Erdoğan came to the 
defence of Iran over attacks from the UN, led by the US, arguing that ‘countries that oppose 
Iran's nuclear weapons should themselves not have nuclear weapons’.103 While this might 
have seemed counter-intuitive, given the benefits of its US alliance, it was compatible with 
the new Turkish strategic posture under the AKP. This is shown by the way Turkey courted 
Iran with the fuel deal while simultaneously undertaking Syrian rapprochement designed to 
move their support away from Iran.104 This is because strong Iran-Syrian relations contain 
(or insulate) Turkey on the northern front of the RSC.105 In contrast, a good relationship with 
Syria gives Turkey increased strategic depth and potential to penetrate the RSC to its south. 
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Overall, courting Iran and Syria allowed Turkey to soften the RSCs periphery and link its 
security dynamics in a positive, rather than negative manner to issues in the region. 
The second, but equally critical regional strategic issue within Turkey’s immediate region is 
the NATO Missile System—the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS)—funded by 
the US, Italy and Germany.106 Ostensibly designed to counter a potential Iranian missile 
threat, the system can also protect NATO countries from a Russian attack. For Turkey this is 
problematic, since Russia has acted aggressively on the issue of a missile shield towards 
NATO. The balancing act required of Turkey was demonstrated when the US did not want to 
name Iran as the specific threat, and Turkey protested because by not naming Iran 
specifically, the US risked antagonizing Russia. Here, worsening relations with Iran would 
occur, by overtly naming it as a threat, which would leave Turkey alone on the periphery of 
the EU. At the same time, this exacerbated the NATO-Russian relationship by not naming 
Iran, again leaving Turkey vulnerable to the north.107  
Turkey’s third major foreign policy shift has been a result of Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’ doctrine.108 Here, the AKP has broken against traditional hard liners opposed to 
Kurdish and Armenian relations, by appealing to those groups in an effort to build a 
strategic region of influence in the east. In contrast to the MEADS and Palestinian issues, the 
‘zero problems’ policy is a way of desecuritising issues that affect its ability to project more 
salient security dynamics into the Middle East region. Thus, in defiance of Kemalist 
tradition, the AKP has started engaging with Iraqi Kurdistan on security and economic 
issues,109 while taking a more conciliatory tone with Kurds within Turkey’s state borders. 
While the Kurdish issue revolves around a domestic ‘identity’ issue,110 its prominence in the 
larger global security debate throughout the 1990s acted to tarnish Turkey’s international 
reputation. Similarly, better relations with Armenia, with whom Turkey also has a 
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tempestuous history, opens up Azerbaijan to influence, whose shared Turkic heritage led 
Erdoğan to proclaim that Turkey and Azerbaijan were ‘one nation with two states’.111 This, in 
turn, increases the potential buffer region between Russia and Turkey, meaning 
engagement in the south does not expose it as much in the north and northeast. Indeed, 
Buzan speculates that an insulating ‘mini’ complex could appear in the Caucasus,112 which 
could move the insulating role further north leaving Turkey more to the centre of a new 
regional structure. 
The Societal Sector: Champions of Islam versus Secularists 
Pulling back against the Turkish political sector’s gravitation towards the Middle East is 
the Turkish military class. Importantly, the ‘military’ in Turkey not only occupies the military 
sector, but is such a broad force that it also dominates much of the societal sector. 
Therefore, in this analysis I apply the societal lens when approaching the military in order to 
demonstrate how RSCTs sectoral analysis can redirect traditional ideas across different 
arenas. In Turkey, a central role of the military is to shape and retain the identity (or ‘brand’) 
of the state through Kemalism. This is perpetuated through the concept known as derin 
devlet (or the ‘deep state’) which runs through many Turkish state institutions. Successive 
coups have demonstrated the power of the derin devlet, with the 1971 coup known as the 
‘coup by memorandum’, while the 1997 coup became known as the ‘post-modern coup’.113 
The later instance gained its name when generals submitted a list of issues to the 
government that were to be enforced, before demanding the Prime Minister resign in what 
became known as the ‘February 28th process’. The list contained liberal provisions, designed 
to prevent a shift towards political Islam and the Middle East, including enforcement of a 
headscarf ban, provisions for eight years of primary education, and the closing of Quranic 
schools.114 Problematically, for actions that ultimately have their basis in improving 
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‘Western’ relations, the derin devlet and the February 28th process has threatened potential 
Western stakeholders in Turkey, with a leaked US cable complaining that successive Turkish 
governments are ‘nothing but servants of the deep state’.115 
Following the 1997 coup, the ruling Welfare Party was banned for violating Kemalist 
principles.116 The military justified the ban on the grounds that creeping Islamism within the 
party had the objective of making its way into schools and organisations with the ultimate 
goal of instituting Sharia law, which would move Turkey societally in the direction of its 
neighbour Iran.117 Recently, the AKP has attempted to counter the power of the military 
class through actions such as the September 2010 referendum, which aimed to weaken the 
military’s control on the judicial structure.118 Still, despite nearly a decade of AKP 
government, Kemalism continues to be a strong force, with Former Chief of General Staff 
General Kıvrıkoğlu—a staunch Kemalist representative of the military elites—stating that ‘if 
the tendency toward reactionaryism [sic] lasts for 500 years, […then…] February 28 will last 
for 500 years’.119 With a general election scheduled for the 12th of June 2011, and polls 
showing an increased majority for the AKP,120 Kemalist principles are likely to be further 
challenged. 
Despite these insulating forces, issues such as the MEADS paradox have allowed a shift 
towards strategic pragmatism, allowing Turkey to attempt securitisation moves on 
contentious issues. The most obvious challenge to Kemalist principals is the AKPs eagerness 
to position itself as a regional champion for Islamic rights, which acts to explicitly link the 
political and societal sectors. At its most antagonistic, Turkey has offered to host a Taliban 
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office in Ankara in order to act as a moderator in its political engagement in the region.121 
More prudently, Erdoğan toured Pakistan after the 2010 floods and offered support, while 
making speeches critical of Israel.122 This demonstrates an active pursuit of the Davutoğlu 
Doctrine, which views Turkey as both a conciliator and a ‘centre of gravity’ in the region.123 
So far this approach has been relatively successful, with the Middle Eastern audience—at 
least on the surface—accepting the societal securitisation act. This is shown by a 2010 
Brookings institute survey a year after Erdoğan’s Davos walkout, where Erdoğan was 
perceived as the most admired world leader in the Arab world.124  
There is also a domestic agenda within the AKPs rhetoric whereby its new assertive foreign 
policy is used for populist and political purposes, in order to align itself with the growing 
conservative Anatolian middle class. These constituents are viewed as easily manipulated 
given Turkey’s narrow media environment, and the AKP has taken aggressive steps to 
restrict reporting that it views as distorting the domestic advantages of Turkey’s new 
assertive foreign policy. For example, the AKP pressured Doğan Media Group—a major 
Turkish media corporation and owner of the pro-Kemalist broadsheet Hürriyet—by 
imposing US$2.5 billion in back taxes after Doğan linked the AKP to a charity scandal.125 This 
pattern of media suppression under the AKP has led to Turkey dropping to 138th out of 178 
countries in the latest Reporters without Borders Press Freedom index.126 Having control of 
the media is critical in shaping Turkish societal identity, as ninety percent of Turks are 
monolingual, meaning that their access to outside and Western information is filtered 
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through a few central outlets.127 Low levels of Internet access outside of Istanbul, in 
combination with a strict Internet filtering system also contribute to the narrow 
dissemination of information.128 Through the lens of RSCT, this behaviour can be interpreted 
as an attempt by the AKP to remove Turkey from its insulated position through the linking of 
sectors. 
This bisectoral political-societal approach by the AKP has had visible effects on popular 
culture. For example, the synthesis of political, society, populism and the media is apparent 
in Turkish films such as ‘Valley of the Wolves: Iraq’ (Kurtlar vadisi), where an elite team of 
Turkish police rescue Turks in northern Iraq from Israeli and US illicit organ traders.129 
Similarly, the most recent movie in the series (‘Valley of the Wolves: Palestine’) showed the 
‘team’ exacting revenge on Israelis for the death of Turks during the 2010 Gaza flotilla 
blockade.130 Also, one of the top selling books in Turkey over the past decade was ‘Metal 
Storm’, a semi-fictional novel with some links to the 2003 ‘Hood Event’ (Çuval Hadisesi).131 
In the real-life incident, Turkish troops operating in Iraq were arrested, led away in hoods, 
and interrogated by US military personnel.132 Although it received scant coverage in the 
West, the impact in Turkey was substantial, damaging diplomatic relations between the US, 
and leading to Turkish threats to close its airspace to US planes operating in Iraq.133 This 
form of anti-American sentiment has acted to push parts of Turkey societally east, with a 
2010 survey showing that sixty-seven percent of Turks had an unfavourable opinion of the 
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US.134 Furthermore, anti-Americanism was transferred to anti-EU sentiment by association 
thanks to European involvement in the occupation of Iraq, with the perception of the 
European Union as a positive institution dropping to thirty-seven percent today, compared 
to sixty-three percent at the time of the Hood Event in 2003.135 
These societal shifts away from Kemalism have been made easier by the fact that many of 
Turkey’s secular institutions were founded on the older existing religious frameworks. For 
example, the Muslim brotherhoods and other religious groups were banned under the 
Young Turks, and their structures thereafter regulated by the Diyanet (or Department of 
Religious Affairs).136 Yet many of the organisations were informal, and based around 
patronage and loosely networked associations.137 As such, many religious societal structures 
have survived, albeit in modified forms and under different titles, meaning the switch back 
towards Islamic institutions over the past decade has been relatively seamless. This was 
demonstrated by a ten percent increase (to forty-five percent) of people who identify 
themselves as ‘Muslim’, as opposed to ‘secular’ between 1999 and 2006.138 
These themes within Turkish society suggest that the ‘rebranding’ of Turkish identity from a 
Kemalist state to a suppressed regional champion has been fairly successful. Furthermore 
insulating forces from within the state (through Kemalism) have weakened now that Turkey 
has to operate on its ‘own’ without the superpower influence of the past. Indeed, much of 
modern Turkish identity has been about reimagining the state according to its political 
needs. In this context, Kemalism can be viewed as a rewriting of official history in the post 
WWI environment, by distancing and rebranding itself as distinct from the Ottoman 
Empire.139 In contrast, the post-Cold War environment can be viewed in terms of a 
loosening of domestic societal constraints. As a result, there is some evidence that the 
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revitalisation of Islam within Turkey can be linked to regionalist rhetoric, which has the 
grander purpose of linking security dynamics into the broader regional environment.  
Though the recent successes of this ‘rebranding’ suggest that the Middle East may accept 
some of the Turkish securitisation moves, there are historical barriers which constrain and 
push back this attempt to escape insulation. The foremost issue is the Arab image of 
Ottomans as the entity that ended the caliphate, and suppressed Arabic language and 
cultural values. Much of modern Arab nationalism was born as a reaction to the failures of 
the Ottoman Empire. Here, the Ottomans became identified as the ‘betrayers of Islam’ due 
to their secular policies while acting as the ‘false’ defenders of Mecca and Jerusalem.140 At 
the same time, the British stoked Arab nationalism and promoted ideas such as Wahhabism 
and anti-Ottomanism as a way to ferment discontent within the Middle East in order to 
fracture any pan-Islamist movements.141 To the south and east, the Ottomans suppressed 
the use of the Arabic language in favour of Turkish,142 with these issues all catalysing to 
begin the ‘Great Arab Revolt’ of 1916-1918. More recently, some post Baathist sectarian 
violence in Iraq has been attributed to long time suppression of Shia under Sunni elites 
supported by first the Ottomans, and then the British.143 These factors combine to create 
considerable societal obstacles for Turkey to deeply securitise the idea that it is a champion 
of Islamic rights, which in turn constrains the wider goals of the AKPs agenda, leading to 
Turkey’s continued insulation at the periphery of the Middle East. 
The Economic Sector: The New East 
The economic sector offers an opportunity for Turkey to erase many of the Ottoman 
memories, since wealth is often a powerful motivator in international relations. Turkey now 
has the strongest economy in the region, possessing nearly double the nominal GDP of its 
nearest rival, Saudi Arabia, and three times more than Egypt.144 There have been some 
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moves to exploit this. For example, Turkey’s exports to the EU are now less than fifty 
percent of its total, while Middle Eastern exports have doubled over the last decade to 
twenty percent overall.145 Furthermore, the Turkish political structure that oversees trade—
though opaque in European terns—is one of the more transparent on the Middle Eastern 
front. As such, the recent upheavals during the Arab revolutions produced little anxiousness 
in the Turkish leadership, and indeed have been upheld as a potential model for the newly 
reformed states,146 which in turn can open up new markets. 
Thus, behind the domestic and international politicking, Turkey has been emboldened by its 
political successes and can capitalise on these to link its security dynamics through 
economic entwinement. Regardless of Middle Eastern political memory, and despite 
obstacles to the EU accession process, the successes of the AKP that can be leveraged 
include; economic responsibility that resulted in stability in the face of the 2009 global 
financial crisis (GFC); G20 membership; and a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. 
Turkey is justifiably proud of these achievements, and has a legitimate case to promote 
them, especially in the new global environment. 
These issues combine with a change in the balance between the economic sectors 
surrounding Turkey. Western Europe, for centuries the wealthiest part of the Eurasian and 
Middle Eastern hub is being challenged by the emerging resource wealth in areas such as 
Russia and the Gulf states. Thus while EU markets have been hit hard by the GFC, markets in 
the Middle East and developing world have been less affected.147 In this context, Ziya Meral 
and Jonathon Paris view the new strategic outlook as pragmatic economic decisions and 
vice-versa.148 The economy continues to place Turkey in a strong position, with growth of 
6.1% predicted in 2011, compared to 1.8% in EU member states.149 
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Within this case, the synthesis of sectors150 has allowed the incorporation of non-
traditional discourse into the structural debate, particularly in regards to the role of the 
societal sector in Turkey. A particular behaviour that RSCT has revealed is how different 
sectors have conflicting agendas which contributes to the persistence of Turkey’s status 
quo—or insulation. Parts of the societal sector and the political domestic sector are pushing 
towards the Middle East RSC. This is most noticeable in speech acts on issues such as the 
Palestinian question which have a large symbolic purpose rather than practical end goals. 
The AKP has elevated and attempted to securitise this issue with the goal of linking the 
Turkish societal sector to that of the Middle East. But the military—when viewed through 
the societal lens—pulls back against this securitisation move, and therefore continues 
Turkey’s insulation. The economic sector, although growing, is still in its infancy, but has the 
potential to ‘tip the balance’ towards the Middle East in the future. With this in mind, I now 
turn to consider Turkey’s behaviour in the context of the EU RSC.  
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Chapter 4: Turkey and the EU RSC 
The characteristics of the EU RSC are markedly different from those of the Middle East, 
as is the Turkish relationship with the members of that complex. While securitisation moves 
that aim at escaping insulation in the Middle East RSC were projected into a potentially 
volatile area, the EU RSC is a highly institutionalised and stable entity. Therefore Turkey 
should have clear and obvious advantages from EU engagement in terms of both security 
and wealth. A distinctive feature of the EU RSC is that, for the most part, RSC membership is 
indistinguishable from EU membership.151 In sectoral terms, this is because one goal of the 
EU is for the economic sector to supersede the military sector, and create such intensive 
institutional overlay that conflict becomes unthinkable.152 Yet in practice, the Turkish 
accession process has been slow, and typified by indifference from Europe when compared 
to the accession processes of developmentally comparative states such as Poland, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Romania.  
In order to investigate the extent of insulation of Turkey from the West, I start with the 
economic sector, which is often perceived to be the dominant sector in this region, given it 
contains the major securitisation processes. My analysis shows that this is not necessarily 
the case, and to demonstrate this I look at the central obstacle to EU accession—Greco-
Turkish animosity—within the political sector before transferring across to the societal 
sector in order to assess the role of identity and historical memory. This approach 
demonstrates the ‘widening’ ability of RSCT, away from the most visible securitisation 
processes, with the aim of revealing insulating behaviour. 
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EU RSC Structure 
In contrast to the Middle East RSC, the EU RSC is a centred type,153 but one that also 
possesses a set of unique structural qualities when compared to other regions. Here, Buzan 
asserts the EU is a hybrid power, in that it is a superpower in its own right.154 For him, the 
EU is a Kantian example of anarchic structure, where the constituent state units act as 
‘friends’, following Alexander Wendt’s reading of the international structure.155 If we accept 
the idea of the EU as a superpower actor, then the EU RSC is highly cohesive. Here, only 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and the former Yugoslav states remain outside the EU, with 
Iceland, Croatia, Montenegro and FYR Macedonia candidate states for accession.156 
Potential for conflict between states in this RSC has been minimal, with the exception of 
Serbia and its former proxy—Republika Srpska—whom remain the only European targets of 
NATO military operations in Europe.157 If the EU RSC did become a unitary actor in its own 
right in the future, this would result in the RSC expanding, because according to Buzan and 
Wæver a RSC must consist of at least two autonomous units.158 In this instance, Turkey, but 
also Georgia and the Ukraine could become part of the EU through a default external 
enlargement. 
In contrast with the Middle East RSC, the EU RSCs power resides at the centre, and becomes 
progressively weaker when moving away from the core. The centre consists of an industrial 
powerhouse (Germany), accompanied by France, Italy and the United Kingdom.159 At the 
periphery are weaker states, such as Romania, which has a current GDP PPP of $13,392 
USD. Germany, at the centre, has a GDP PPP of $36,000.160 The recent global financial crisis 
revealed the ‘concentric circles’ structure of the EU RSC, with the core—France, Germany, 
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Switzerland and Austria—remaining fiscally strong, while the periphery countries Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Iceland161 and Spain were heavily exposed to the 2010 sovereign debt 
crisis.162 Overall, this regional order creates a strong central anchor, which when combined 
with the institutions of the EU results in a stable regional order. 
As such, Turkish admission to the EU potentially threatens the centred nature of the RSC. It 
would change the RSC’s polarity from a strong centre-periphery model to a more multipolar 
one, leading to structural constraints on its attempts to join Europe. Karen Smith identifies 
this shifting anchor pulling the EU eastwards as a problematic issue, with the hard edges of 
the region creating strong cleavages between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.163 The potential to 
destabilise the EU is demonstrated by the stronger patterns of amity and enmity that Turkey 
has with its Balkan neighbours than with the centre.164 In this circumstance, Turkish 
membership would risk a new subregional power for Balkan and weaker periphery states to 
turn to in the event of grievances. In fact, support for the Turkish accession process is 
highest in the Balkans, with 85% of Macedonians and 62% of Romanians showing support, 
compared to only 19% in France and 16% in Germany.165 Thus, even though Turkey is an 
emerging economy (its GDP PPP would be roughly the same as EU member Romania at 
$13,392166) it would possess the second largest population, and the seventh largest nominal 
GDP in the EU.167 This would shift the polar axis of European power substantially eastward.  
While the potential for decentralisation captures one aspect of the constraints against 
Turkish membership of the EU RSC, other more opaque factors must be investigated for 
insulating behaviour. This can be achieved by exposing it to RSCTs sectoral discourse. Here, I 
start with the economic sector, and then turn to the political sector, in which I explore the 
most visible obstacle in EU relations, which is the conflict over Cyprus. The final part then 
moves to the societal sector, which reveals paradoxical behaviours that curtail Turkish 
attempts to move west. 
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The Economic Sector: EU integration 
The origins of Turkish-European integration attempts date back to Turkey’s accession to 
NATO in 1952, which provided external military protection for the state and remains in 
place today, albeit in a modified form. This was driven not directly by specific European 
security dynamics, but instead by US external pressure, as a way to manage Soviet threats in 
the region. But while NATO provided military protection, EEC membership promised 
institutional and economic entwinement, which was a potentially stronger long-term 
security proposition. As a result, Turkey first submitted its application for membership in 
1959. This was followed in 1963 by the Ankara agreement, in which Bülent Ecevit laid out 
integration in security terms through Turkey’s transition into the EEC, with Turkey accepted 
as an associate member.168 Later, in 1970, the Ankara agreement was extended to form a 
pseudo-free trade agreement with the EEC, and the US pressured Germany to support 
Ankara’s application in order to ‘anchor’ Turkey in the West.169 Additional international 
issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and radical leftist terrorism in the region created 
additional pressure on the US to assist Turkish entry into the region. In this regard, Turkey 
did manage to link its security concerns with the region through the military sector, but this 
was offset by the economic and political sectors. 
Turkish domestic instability was a key factor militating against EU accession and full 
economic integration. In particular, military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 led to a 
perceived gap between EU and Turkish political standards. Because of this, after the initial 
EEC application being made in 1959, it was not until 1987 that Ankara again formally made 
an application for full EEC membership. But again the EEC deferred Turkey’s application on 
numerous grounds, including human rights, the unresolved natured of the Cyprus and 
Aegean Sea issues with Greece, and a lack of political and democratic reforms.170 In 1995, 
the EU-Turkey customs union was formed and allowed free trade between the two areas, 
and again EU accession looked more likely. However, the 1997 military coup and subsequent 
EU protests delayed this. Finally, in 1999, forty years after its initial submission, Turkey was 
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formally recognised as a candidate state for EU membership.171 Accession negotiations 
opened in 2002, with official talks starting in 2005.172 
Without the overlay of Cold War rivalry, the bar for membership was set higher for Turkey 
than for any past EU candidate states. In fact, the acquis communautaire, which enables a 
transition to a unified EU political, economic, and legal system, was extended to thirty-five 
chapters from thirty-one, for both the Turkish and Croatian accession processes.173 Since 
the official opening of the acquis, the enthusiasm for Turkish accession has again waned. As 
of 2011, of the thirty-five chapters Croatia has agreements on twenty-five while Turkey has 
an agreement on only one.174 Only two chapters—food safety and the environment—have 
been opened since 2009, with eight chapters frozen over Turkey’s refusal to allow Greece to 
use its ports or airspace.175  
An additional factor in the EU’s resistance stems from the fear of an excessive economic 
cost to align Turkey’s legal and political frameworks with European norms and standards. 
Thus, in cost-benefit terms, the lack of threats from Turkey over the past fifty years results 
in smaller security benefits to Europe from accession.176 This is not to say that Turkey is not 
wanted in the union. It is simply that the motivations to permit it to enter are not as serious 
or salient as they were during the Cold War, when dichotomous political thinking ruled. 
Indeed, economically, Turkey has performed better than many of the peripheral EU states 
without European Central Bank (ECB) supervision, especially Greece, Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland.177 This independence has paradoxically reduced Turkey’s threat perception, making 
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EU accession less critical in the economic domain when compared to potential instability 
from popular protest movements against austerity measures in Greece178 and Spain.179 
The Political Sector: Greco-Turkish Conflict 
The one issue that does keep Turkey pertinent to Brussels is its relationship with 
Greece. Thus by moving to the political sector (which is ultimately about state stability180), 
we can gain a clearer picture of the processes of securitisation at work. Here, two separate 
behaviours can be observed. Firstly, Greece is using the EU accession process as a way for it 
to desecuritise Turkey on hard-line issues that affect its own security.181 Greece’s position on 
the periphery (but within the EU RSC) has some similarities with Turkey, in the sense that it 
needs to raise the profile of its security concerns with the centre of the RSC. In this instance, 
Greek accession support for Turkey is contingent on the removal of forces from northern 
Cyprus.182  
In contrast, continued use of the Cyprus issue by Turkey can be viewed as an attempt to 
persistently securitise an issue in the hope that it makes Turkey more pertinent to the EU 
RSC with the hope that it presents openings for Turkey to escape insulation. For Turkey, this 
is the only real pattern of amity and enmity that penetrates into the RSC, and is one of 
Turkey’s best hopes for RSC membership. But since Greece is a relatively weak state, this 
prevents these security dynamics from gaining traction. In regards to insulation we can see 
how these political manoeuvres at the periphery of the RSC have very little impact on the 
centre, leading to a continued inability to securitise issues of relevance to the EU. Overall, it 
means that the factors having substantial effects on the EU accession process can be viewed 
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as part of a smaller political game, being played by policy planners within both Greece and 
Turkey for their own state security objectives. Thus, the Cyprus issue, which is very narrow 
in an ethnic and geographical sense, is widened into affecting the dominant securitisation 
process (EU accession). To the EU elites in Brussels, the Greco-Turkish conflict possesses 
very little threat to the central actors in the RSC, while simultaneously confirming Turkey’s 
‘outsider’ status in terms of European norms. At the same time, resolution of the conflict 
risks further insulating Turkey by diffusing existing Turkish-EU security pertinence. 
Away from the Greco-Turkish issue, Turkish political relations with other EU RSC states are 
stable,183 which helps maintain a low Turkish threat perception to the members of the RSCs 
political sector. This contrasts with the admission of the former Eastern bloc states, where 
despite weaker economies and questionably opaque political structures, few obstacles were 
encountered.184 For example, Romania was formally admitted to the EU in 2007, along with 
Bulgaria after submitting official applications for membership in 1995, thirty-six years after 
Turkey’s initial submission. There are two key points to highlight here. First, these two states 
surround the volatile region of the Balkans, which has the potential to destabilise the EU 
RSC; and secondly, instability in this region could have led to a renewal of Russian overlay, as 
occurred in Serbia during and after the Yugoslav war. These factors have combined to create 
urgency in the EU political class to securitise the Romanian and Bulgarian states by 
institutionalising them within EU. Without this, issues emitting from them, including 
immigration, the black market, and economic instability might threaten to destabilise other 
states in the RSC. Consequently, these states were desecuritised through political and 
economic entwinement in the EU. This also had the effect of containing and encircling 
Serbia and other potentially troubling nations such as Albania and Kosovo. While a great 
deal of this fear stems from simple geographical factors, more subtle resistance stems from 
the fact that Serbia shares a Slavic ethic identity with Russia, and using RSCT we can assign 
this societal type of variable a great amount of weight. 
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The Societal Sector: A Society Split 
This is why the societal sector is one of the most resonant sectors, which potentially 
reveals the most about insulating activity outside of more traditional analysis. Because of 
this importance, I address two distinct referent objects for Turkey within this sector in 
regards to the EU RSC. The first is the domestic audience, and the second the international 
arena. For the domestic audience, the most pressing concept is the securitisation of its 
historical memory, and the strong societal identity that has been formed since the Young 
Turks initiated their reforms in the 1920s. Like many other states with strong historical 
memories,185 the Turks have constructed a victim narrative, in this case referred to as 
‘Sèvres syndrome’,186 based on the partition of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the 
Western powers. This was a humiliating end for an empire that once controlled most of the 
Balkans and Middle East. While the two major regions to the south and west of Turkey were 
partitioned without major repercussions, the handing of Turkish Thrace to Greece, and the 
clause stipulating the establishment of a Kurdish state,187 were viewed as an attempt to 
extinguish Turkish identity. As a consequence, the Turks rallied against the Treaty of Sèvres, 
and the treaty was not honoured by any of its signatories.188 Subsequently, the European 
powers withdrew from the region, leaving the Greek forces to fight on their own terms. The 
weakened Greek army was eventually defeated in Thrace, and Atatürk’s troops retook 
Thrace, displacing over one million Greeks.189 
This vulnerability at the hands of Europe was the catalyst for Kemalist identity, which was in 
part isolationist, but also partly aimed at socialisation and modernization, with the objective 
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of proving that Islam could be compatible with the liberal democratic ideals of Europe. This 
would secure Turkey from European aggression through the alignment of norms.190 
Historical memory has been worked into many aspects of the EU accession process, with 
the quick accession of Bulgaria and Romania over Turkey perceived domestically as a double 
standard. This evoked memories of Sèvres, and the memory of a European clique of states 
encircling Turkey, in an attempt to undermine its territorial integrity.191 It created a paradox: 
Turkey wants to be wanted by Europe, yet in doing so (through asserting its historical and 
societal independence) it drives Europe further away.  
While we can attribute some of this to historical memory, shifts in societal identity are also 
attributable to changing demographics. Over the past decade the emerging middle class 
who have benefited from the economic reforms of the AKP are predominantly centre-right 
Anatolians.192 Furthermore, this group are antagonised by the Kemalist leaning military and 
political elites in Istanbul being more conservative and religious in nature.193 Given that it is 
the society—not the military—that is ultimately the key stakeholder in the EU accession 
process, we can assume that the securitisation act of bringing Turkish society into the EU 
has not been fully accepted by its intended audience. This results in a push away from 
Europe in societal perceptions within Turkey regarding Europe. Some 74% of Turks 
supported EU accession in 2004 while only 38% supported membership in 2010.194 Similarly, 
in a 2010 Transatlantic Trends report ‘55% of Turks […felt…] Turkey has such different values 
from the West so as to make it non-Western’.195 Indeed, under the Copenhagen school 
reading, we can view this as the Turkish nation (as opposed to the state as referent object) 
securitising against EU attempts to strip its social identity through institutionalisation. 
There are also securitisation processes in this sector travelling in the reverse direction. This 
is visible in the securitisation of terrorism and immigration by Silvio Berlusconi, who 
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referred to the ‘human tsunami’ of immigration,196 while Nicolas Sarkozy recently discussed 
suspending the Schengen Agreement in relation to Tunisian (or ‘Islamic’) refugees.197 Within 
the EU, this has helped build barriers to Turkish efforts at integration where Islamic 
immigrants ‘threaten’ EU citizens, and led to well-publicised clashes of values, such as the 
Danish newspaper cartoon controversy,198 and the murder of Pim Fortuyn in the 
Netherlands.199 In practical terms this limits the chances of Turkish accession with France, 
Germany, Denmark, and Austria—the states most concerned about immigration—likely to 
reject any accession referendums.200 This is despite the fact the Turkey is a largely peaceful 
and secular country (with the exception of the Kurdish question in their far east). Yet for the 
European audience, the securitisation of immigration, along with the ‘macro-securitisation’ 
of terrorism by the US, using religion as the referent object, means that Turkey, as a 
predominantly Islamic country, is perceived as a threat by default.201 
Overall, the societal sector is full of conflicting identities and ideas that prevent security 
dynamics from forming strong focussed patterns. Thus, the oxymoronic nature of Turkey 
wanting to be part of Europe, while also being threatened by the loss of its identity, restricts 
the full weight of all sectors being pushed towards EU integration. Similarly, fears from the 
EU of immigration and religion are real enough to create barriers on the continent. These do 
not have a substantial basis in empirical reality, which has led to the political classes 
(especially in Europe) exploiting identity issues on the surface, rather than viewing them as 
imperative issues to thrust the EU accession process into action, which in turn splits the EU 
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RSC sectors that embrace Turkey. It is the combination of these processes that constrain 
Turkish behaviour, and keep Turkey insulated in its status quo position.  
Conclusions 
This case, through the lens of RSCT, has revealed that the economic sector, seemingly so 
dominant in many approaches to Turkish-EU relations, can be overplayed at the expense of 
other sectors. This is highlighted by the role of historical memory and suspicion, which 
diffuses the economic sector’s enthusiasm for Europe. Interestingly, this case, like the 
Middle East case, has revealed how Turkey has elevated certain security issues in order to 
increase their pertinence to the centre of the EU. In the Middle Eastern case it was 
Palestine. In the European case, it is Cyprus.  
More importantly, the European case reveals insulating behaviour, with Europe constraining 
Turkey because of fears of shifting the anchor of this centred RSC east, given Turkey’s large 
population and emerging economy. For Europe, this is primarily a geopolitical consideration, 
which has been reinforced by societal differences, while Turkey has elevated the Cyprus 
issue in an attempt to circumvent the geographical realities of its position at the fringe of 
Europe with little success. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
At the beginning of this thesis I noted that I aimed to assess the utility of RSCT’s 
category of insulators as a way to understand Turkish behaviour in a regional context. As the 
previous two chapters demonstrate, RSCT’s analytical framework seems revealing: that 
there are a number of factors that contribute to Turkey’s continued insulation. On the one 
hand, Turkey has elevated certain security issues (such as the Palestinian question and the 
Cyprus conflict) in order to securitise them, with the purpose of joining either the Middle 
East and EU RSCs, which in turn moves it away from insulation. But on the other hand, 
internal and external factors, across different sectors insulate Turkey from joining its 
security dynamics with surrounding RSCs. In this chapter, then, I demonstrate that RSCT 
reveals a phenomenon within insulators that I have termed ‘sectoral divergence’. This is 
where insulators, because of competing securitization moves, push sectors in different 
directions, restricting their ability to ‘escape’ their insulated position. 
However, while these findings show a coherent and fluid framework in which to understand 
insulators, this does not absolve RSCT of some wider problems in the Copenhagen School’s 
attempt to create a via media for positivist and post-positivist scholarship. For example, I 
also find that a great deal of Turkish behaviour is the result of structural constraints, 
including EU resistance to decentralisation. Consequently, a great deal of information can 
be extracted from geographical factors, rather than revealed by the sometimes abstruse 
discourse on securitisation. This means the discourse has a tendency to fetishize behaviours 
aimed at appeasing domestic constituents at the expense of clear structural constrains. 
Despite this, I assert that sectoral divergence has future potential as a way to explain the 
behaviour of ‘outlier’ states. This chapter presents these findings, before closing with a 
summary of the main epistemological problems of RSCT—which if clarified—can provide 
useful avenues for future research. 
Insulators Elevate Certain Security Issues in Order to Securitise Them 
The most prominent behaviour identified in the two cases is how Turkey, as an insulator, 
has not attached urgency to the resolution of the Greco-Turkish conflict. Instead, it has 
elevated its status in the security relationship with the EU by not resolving this, in spite of 
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the apparent benefits of doing so. For example, the nine Acquis Communitaire chapters 
frozen because of Turkey’s stance on Cyprus include minor issues such as fisheries and 
transport policy, but also key chapters including ‘the Free Movement of Goods’.202 
According to a 2006 report, resolution of the Cyprus conflict and the potential for quicker 
EU accession would result in an US$800 million economic yearly advantage for Turkey, 
compared to a current net loss of US$480 million per year to maintain its current military 
presence in northern Cyprus.203 An even more optimistic report found that Turkey would 
benefit by EUR$17 billion annually from resolution of the Cyprus issue.204 From this 
utilitarian perspective, the maintenance of the Turkish Cypriot population205 is a false 
economy, with a large economic cost to Turkey, which points to other instruments at work 
in Turkey’s foreign policy logic. 
RSCT unlocks this puzzle. Using its lens, we can assert that resolution of the Cyprus issue 
would make Turkey’s security less pertinent to the centre of the EU. Therefore, the 
continued low-level conflict, which presents no major threat to the integrity of the state, 
results in Turkey being kept high on the list of potentially resolvable issues to the EU. The 
benefits from elevation of the issue outweigh the prospective resolution benefits. 
Additionally, from Turkey’s perspective, the resolution of the Cyprus question does not 
guarantee Turkish accession. In fact, it threatens to decrease its broader security prospects 
because it risks further isolation and vulnerability. So while both Bulgaria and Romania 
faced similar barriers to Turkey in EU accession, with high levels of corruption and organised 
crime, combined with substantial human rights and immigration concerns,206 both 
experienced quick accession processes due to their comparatively low proximate threat 
levels. In this instance, quick accession ameliorated the potential formation of Russo-
Serbian amity patterns by geographically blocking them. But Turkey does not have this 
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geographical propinquity, which means that as an insulator, it needs to emit both strong 
enmity and amity patterns in order to maintain relevance to the EU RSC. Geography is again 
a factor in foreign policy interaction where Ankara must now project its concerns via 
Brussels in order to address a security issue only seventy kilometres off its southern coast. 
On the Middle Eastern side, similar phenomena can be observed. At the beginning of the 
21st century, Turkey had few security links to the Middle East, with the exception of ties to 
the Kurdish question in Iraq and Syria. While Turkey was less exposed to this region during 
the Cold War, when superpower overlay made it strategically significant to the great 
powers, the changing power balance over the past twenty years has created a more 
vulnerable and isolated position. Using RSCT, we can link this vulnerability to the recent 
securitisation of the Palestinian question by the AKP, which allowed Turkey to link its 
security dynamics to a broader range of Arab actors, in a way that works favourably to its 
security position. By elevating this issue—which has little impact on its immediate 
security—it increases its relevance to the Middle East RSC, which helps to balance out any 
potential enmity patters directed against Turkey, such as the historical memory of Ottoman 
suppression, and blowback from recent issues such as the MEADS system. 
Internal Forces Contribute to Insulation 
While RSCs have an aggregate influence comparable to great powers,207 insulators 
construct their own tools to deal with security issues found within their borders. In Turkey 
this is demonstrated by Kemalism, which has been challenged by the foreign policy of the 
AKP over the past decade. Here, domestic forces work against each other, helping maintain 
insulation. These internal forces also support a key structuralist argument, which is that 
states will always act in their own self-interest. 
In this sense, we can view the struggle between Kemalists and Islamism as a balance 
between escaping insulation on positive or negative terms. While RSCT generally 
hypothesises that RSC membership makes a state less vulnerable than an insulator, 
escaping insulation on negative terms is not in the state interest. In this sense, EU accession 
and membership of the EU RSC is a positive move, which should increase the security of the 
state because of its inherent stability. In contrast, escaping insulation on negative terms, 
through—for example, a hypothetical conflict with Iran, Iraq and Syria—would risk the 
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immediate state security, giving Turkey RSC membership, but outweighing the security 
disadvantages of insulator status. We can see balancing between negative and positive 
security occurring when Erdoğan made his speech acts in securitisation moves towards 
relatively ‘soft’ issues such as Palestine, which resonate loudly, but require little empirical 
action. While this antagonises hard-line Kemalists, the continuation of the Cyprus policy 
balances this out. We can also assume that given modern Turkish history, the AKP is aware 
that the force of Kemalism will constrain any actions on the ‘hard’ side of security, which 
can cause empirical damage to the state. In this sense, the AKP can be self-assured in its 
outward rhetoric, with the knowledge that the most aggressive actions will be contained by 
Kemalists. In this context, it can act assertively and feign innocence when Kemalism 
restrains them, which allows it to keep face with its domestic constituents. 
Different Sectors Pushing in Different Directions Constrain Insulators 
From these findings, we can build a premise that within Turkey different sectors push in 
different directions, as demonstrated by diagram A.  
 
Diagram A: ‘Sectoral divergence’ in Turkey 
Most notably, within Turkey, the economic sector pushes strongly towards the EU RSC, 
thanks to the institutional nature of the EU, which sees the majority of security threats as 
ameliorated through economic entwinement. In contrast, the societal sector, and 
particularly the emerging middle class, has a religious, historical and societal relationship 
with the Middle East, many of whom view European motives with suspicion. This is most 
visible in the Anatolian east of the country, where support for the AKP is strongest, as 
opposed to Istanbul and Turkey’s west, which is the wealthiest and most modernised 
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region.208 At the domestic level, the AKP has used this split as a wedge issue to drive 
popular support, resulting in a distinct difference in the directionality of the societal and 
economic sectors. It is the combination of these two opposing sectors, working in different 
directions, which contributes to continued insulation. From these findings we can suggest 
that without the full weight of sectors pressing in a single direction, it is hard for states to 
escape insulator status. It is worth contrasting how Turkey differs from Romania in this 
situation. For Romania, the societal sector is enthusiastic about the EU process, with most 
people identifying as European, and only 7% of people viewing the EU in a negative light.209 
Again, this is despite a low GPD PPP and persistent concerns over issues such as corruption 
and human rights. In contrast, only 34% of Turkish citizens currently support the EU 
accession process, down from 78% in 2004.210 The contribution of sectoral divergence to 
insulating behaviour is further amplified by the split across the domestic/international 
divide in the political sector, through tension between the AKP and Kemalists where this 
sector is split and pushed in opposite directions. 
This ability to analyse the direction in which sectors pull is one of the more powerful tools 
of RSCT, although it is not one explicitly recognised by Buzan and Wæver in their rather 
limited explanation of insulation in Regions and Powers.211 This could possess great value 
for future research on ‘outlier’ states and how they behave. In this sense, it allows for 
sectoral divergence to be developed as a tool in explaining how outlier states such as Turkey 
are constrained in their attempts to escape insulation. Further development of this point is 
of importance to RSCT, because it can potentially be tested against other insulators. For 
example, application to Afghanistan might reveal clues to why it has existed in a perpetual 
state of conflict for so long. As a preliminary hypothesis we could suggest that Afghanistan, 
as an insulator, uses enmity patterns that keep it relevant in international affairs, and has no 
real motivation to resolve its troubled status. This might also have prescriptive value in 
areas such as central Africa where Kenya, as another insulator state, struggles to deal with 
the highly volatile Horn proto-complex to the north and the Central African RSC to the west. 
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Many Turkish Actions Result from Structural Constraints  
However, as many Turkish actions result from structural constraints, other frameworks 
may better account for Turkish actions. The case studies have demonstrated that a 
substantial part of Turkey’s insulating behaviour stems from standard structural and 
geographical variables. For example, the natural position of Turkey at the fringe of a largely 
stable and wealthy economic area means that foreign policy engagement with the EU is 
common sense and the advantages self-evident without resorting to the securitisation 
discourse. Furthermore, the contrasting examples of Bulgarian and Romanian accession 
revealed geography as the dominant variable. So, while societal restraints and securitization 
moves are apparent, it is not entirely necessary for a mixed approach to exist. This prosaic 
explanation based in the structural elements of RSCT is a key criticism, where there is a 
tendency to fixate on securitisation as a social construct at the expense of more obvious 
conclusions. Thus overall, while patterns of insulation can be identified that are not found in 
other frameworks, this comes at the expense of other problems.  
As a result, criticism can be made along the lines that many of the issues revealed by RSCT 
can be found in alternative discourses, which do not have the problems of RSCTs ‘via media’ 
and do not have the restriction of mutually exclusive regions on which RSCT insists, with its 
larger goal of creating a metanarrative. While RSCT is flexible and attempts to build on the 
neorealist project, its use of exclusivity within regions and rigid internal characteristics—
such as ‘centred’, ’standard’ and ‘balanced’, combined with the epistemologically capricious 
nature of securitization discourse—comes at the expense of other approaches.  
For example, our initial identification of scholarly gaps regarding the buffer state can be 
answered in simpler terms by Randall Schweller, who views the impact of small states on 
great powers as somewhat analogous to the ‘butterfly effect’. Here, ‘small local disruptions 
quickly grow into large disruptions as their effects cascade and reverberate throughout the 
system’.212 Similarly, Turkey’s shift to the Middle East can be seen as a form of hedging 
against the EU amid fears stemming from the Treaty of Sèvres. Hedging as a concept is not 
new, but has come back into favour as a way of describing the actions of smaller actors in 
Southeast Asia towards China.213 Overall, Turkey is in an excellent hedging position, with a 
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recently leaked diplomatic cable describing Turkish foreign policy as having ‘Rolls Royce 
ambitions but Rover resources […] to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have to 
“cheat” by finding an underdog’.214 Essentially, Turkey is playing the two regions off against 
each other, for its own strategic advantage.  
While RSCT allows for the use of different referent objects, in the case of Turkey, the split 
between domestic and international political sectors becomes fuzzy. There is a tendency for 
RSCT to link each referent object within its own ‘world’ of issues, which creates problems 
when linking together two closely associated levels of analysis. In such instances, Turkey’s 
actions are potentially better explained by Robert Putnam’s two level games logic, without 
the need to resort to an entirely new analytical process.215 Here, Putnam likens the 
domestic-international split to two ‘images’ with a bargaining process linking the two, 
rather than RSCTs independent analysis of objects.216 Furthermore, to Putnam, the two-
level approach is ubiquitous in state politics, and thus unlike RSCT is not an ‘added extra’. 
Applied to Turkey, this would result in a much greater analysis of the role of Kemalism and 
its interaction with external actors, rather than RSCs object-based approach. Here, RSCT 
reveals a broad spectrum of issues between these two object levels, but fails to adequately 
explain the immediate interdependence between them.217  
Part of this problem stems from the fact that RSCT has positioned itself as a via media and 
metanarrative, yet ultimately absolves itself of some of these criticisms by design. For 
example, while at one point, Buzan and Wæver claim that insulators are ‘durable and 
consistent’,218 they follow this with the claim that insulators are almost always candidates 
for external transformation.219 And while RSCT does have a predictive form220 they assert 
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that this is only a narrower of potential outcomes, rather than a causal predictor.221 These 
inconsistencies in the intent and position of the theory in scholarship clash with its rigidness 
in other areas, ultimately restricting its usefulness. 
RSCT is a Problematic Via Media 
It follows from this that a key criticism of RSCT lies in the via media where it mixes 
positivist and post-positivist concepts. This fetishizes the explanatory epistemology at the 
expense of critically evaluating its core precepts and allows securitisation processes, begun 
by political ‘speech acts’, to be open to selection bias. In this instance, a writer with a 
preconceived agenda can effectively build a case for securitisation of any potential issue on 
fringe or radical issues. At the same time, speech acts are often overly influenced by the 
media. For example, our illustration in this research of Erdoğan’s behaviour at Davos can be 
interpreted as a media stunt, performed for mainly domestic reasons, with analysis of this 
act rendering little more than character information around a sycophantic personality. 
Claudia Aradua demonstrates this malleability of securitisation by describing ‘pity’, 
‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ as securitisable objects in the context of human trafficking and EU 
policy.222 This demonstrates the epistemological problems of the securitisation discourse, as 
while diversification and widening is welcome, pity and power are very different concepts in 
the context of international politics. This exaggerated widening of scope threatens to 
amplify and discredit outputs to serious policy practitioners.  
Overall, these issues have consequences for the outputs of RSCT. If we return to the point 
made initially in this thesis regarding the usefulness of IR outputs to policy planners, then 
RSCT is open to distortion and bias, making its results susceptible to manipulation. 
Ultimately this stems from RSCTs attempt to fuse the constructivist and structuralist 
domains, and this has been one of the key criticisms of the Copenhagen Project, creating 
what prominent Copenhagen School critic Bill McSweeney terms an ‘objectivist theory with 
relativist consequences’.223 In other words, neorealism is designed to emphasise the 
empirical side of political science, while the use of constructivism, whatever its form, will 
                                                          
221
 Ibid., 70. 
222
 Aradau, “The perverse politics of four-letter words: risk and pity in the securitisation of human 
trafficking.” 
223
 Bill McSweeney, “Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school,” Review of 
International Studies 22, no. 1 (1996): 86. 
 57 
 
‘taint’ the results. This usage could potentially aggravate the poor policy responses 
addressed earlier in this thesis, in areas such as Iraq, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.  
RSCT Variations 
This is not to say that RSCT is without use, especially in regards to addressing the issue 
of outlier states within the international system. Indeed, many of the existing studies using 
RSCT and Turkey have used modified versions of RSCT. For example, Alper Kaliber uses RSCT 
to analyse Turkey’s regional security dynamics, but rejects the necessity for RSCs to be fixed 
geographical entities,224 allowing a more flexible interpretation of Turkey’s position on the 
periphery of Europe. At the same time, André Barrinha uses RSCT to link the Kurdish issue 
and the war on terror via US overlay.225 In his piece, he deemphasises the local structural 
elements of RSCT, preferring to rely primarily on securitisation discourse to demonstrate 
how Turkish insulation can be demonstrated by a lack of pertinence about the Kurdish issue 
to the US, despite its ‘terrorist’ nature. 
In this vein, further research using the concept of sectoral divergence, removed from some 
of the restraints of the discourse has the potential to reveal valuable information about the 
behaviours and constraints on outlier states. This expansion would enable exploration of 
many states for insulating behaviour, and not just those few states that fit within RSCT’s 
metanarrative. In the concluding chapter that follows, I examine this in more detail. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
At the outset I asked whether RSCT can explain the behaviour of outlier or ‘insulator’ 
states. Turkey was chosen as a case as its behaviour has eluded many other frameworks, 
with a unique foreign policy and societal outlook that sits awkwardly between the East and 
West. RSCT was viewed as an excellent candidate through which to direct this research. The 
goals were clear, yet flexible, and I have extracted the following points of importance based 
on the initial criteria laid down to assess RSCT. 
Main Findings 
First, RSCT has the ability to expand and incorporate ‘non-traditional’ discourse into the 
structural debate. This is clearly demonstrated by the Middle Eastern-Turkish relationship. 
Here, the ambiguous nature of Turkish political, societal and economic activities has led to 
crude dyadic outputs from other frameworks. Instead, RSCTs sectoral tools were able to 
identify conflicting patterns between the societal and political sectors, with Turkish society 
having a natural affinity with the Middle Eastern region, while the political sector has 
numerous pragmatic security concerns.  
Second, while the advantages of the EU-Turkish relationship appear clear, RSCT revealed 
insulating forces within the societal sector, which constrain Turkish actions as a 
consequence of historical memory and differing concepts of self-identity. While sociological 
and historicist ideas are rarely compatible with frameworks primarily concerned with power 
politics, RSCT has shown how society has a greater influence in the overall motives of the 
state than other utility focussed frameworks might suggest.  
Third, RSCT also explains how domestic behaviour works to insulate Turkish actions, with a 
clear internal example. Here, insulation is expressed through Kemalism, which acts as a 
pulling force on attempts by domestic politicians to move Turkey beyond its neutral 
position. Kemalism is an especially potent force when securitisation moves emitted from 
domestic players are perceived as having a potentially negative impact on state security. 
This is because actions to escape insulation through the elevation of security issues come at 
the cost of conflict if not negotiated carefully, especially in the Middle East. 
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This internal regulation is important, with the tests showing that sectors will artificially 
elevate security concerns relevant to them with the purpose of increasing their relevance to 
the RSC of which they seek membership. As part of the analysis I demonstrated that these 
paradoxical actions provided evidence for what I term ‘sectoral divergence’. In Turkey’s case, 
sectors are split, with the economic sector pulling towards Europe, while the societal sector 
pulls towards the Middle East. These domestic amity and enmity pattern result in the 
dilution of the power of the referent object, which in turn constrains and continues the 
insulation of Turkey. 
These findings, though, are at the expense of problems in RSCT. Most notably, many of the 
core findings within RSCT can be arrived at using structural variables rather than the 
securitisation discourse. For example, Romania and Bulgaria have an arguably lower 
institutional and economic capability than Turkey, yet both had short accession processes 
and few obstacles, which can be attributed to an EU need to create a geographically 
congruent entity to defend from threats directed at the only unstable part of Europe since 
the end of the Cold War—the Balkans. In terms of EU resistance to Turkey, much of this can 
be attributed to a simple fear of decentralisation. The need to encompass Turkey’s 
substantial population and strong emerging economy as part of the accession process, risks 
shifting the centre of Europe East and creating fractures in the region, creating a multipolar 
Europe. In the east, strategic pragmatism explains many of the AKPs recent moves, with 
good relationships with its Arab neighbours seen as a way of hedging against any potential 
aggression or isolation from Europe. 
At the broadest level, RSCT is problematic as a via media for positivism and post-positivism, 
as the mix of relativism and objectivism opens it up to potential bias. This is problematic for 
a framework that wishes to address the theory-practice divide which has been growing in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. While this can be used to introduce variables to research 
that have traditionally been unreachable for the structuralist, it allows for the construction 
of threats about anything and everything.     
However, there is value in a less rigid approach to RSCT that eschews the tendency to 
amplify minor securitization processes in favour of a sectoral based approach. This has been 
shown by sectoral divergence which reveals that sectors travelling in opposing directions 
place constraints on Turkey’s ability to exert influence outside of its borders. This makes it a 
tool with the potential to reveal important information about other misunderstood states. 
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Potential for Further Research 
Sectoral divergence is a candidate for further research. Application of this concept to 
other outlier and insulator states such as Burma, North Korea and Afghanistan has the 
potential to reveal why weak states occupy the roles they do. Furthermore, understanding 
how sectorally diverged states sectors elevate particular security concerns could reveal 
information on why these states remain prominent in the international agenda, despite 
their lack of power and latent wealth.   
In Buzan and Wæver’s defence, they finish Regions and Powers by saying that ‘this book 
opens up a research programme rather than completing one’.226 In this light RSCT shows 
some prospects as a new, much needed research project that captures the security 
dynamics of regions in the post-Cold War world. As this thesis has demonstrated, its 
identification of ‘insulators’, despite the ontological problems of its ‘via media’ approach, 
are a useful way to understand ‘outliers’ or buffer states. Moreover, as I have shown here, 
the pressures on an insulator such as Turkey from two different RSCs indicates that sectoral 
divergence can play a significant role in analysing states at the periphery of regions. 
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Regional Subsystem Attribute List  
William Thompson’s collection of attributes in The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual 
Explication and a Propositional Inventory.227 
1. Proximity or primary stress on a geographic region.  
2. The actors pattern of relations or interactions exhibit a particular degree of 
regularity and intensity.  
3. Intrarelatedness - a condition wherein a change at one point in the system affects 
other points.  
4. Internal recognition as distinctive area.  
5. External recognition as distinctive area.  
6. One or more actors.  
7. At least two actors.  
8. At least three actors.  
9. Small powers only.  
10. Units of power are relatively inferior to units in the dominant system.  
11. Subordination in the sense that a change in the dominant system will have a greater 
effect on the subsystem than the reverse and there is more intensive and influential 
penetration of the subsystem by the dominant system than the reverse.  
12. Geographical-historical zone.  
13. Some degree of shared ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds.  
14. A relatively integrated and unified area.  
15. Some evidence of integration or a professed policy of achieving further economic, 
political, and social integration.  
16. Functionally diffuse.  
17. Explicit institutional relations or subsystem organization.  
18. Autonomy-intrasystem actions and responses predominate over external 
influences.  
19. A distinctive configuration of military forces.  
20. A regional equilibrium of local forces.  
21. Common developmental status. 
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